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DeusVult
Evangelos


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PostPosted: Wed, 09-07-2008 7:32 pm    Post subject: Dialogue - IOTA UNUM (Romano AMERIO) Reply with quote

I typed this in the span of four days. "TYPED" not "scanned" Smile.







IOTA UNUM - A Study of Changes in the Catholic Chuch in the XXth Century
Romano AMERIO




            Chapter XVI (p.347-357)


            DIALOGUE


151. Dialogue and discussionism in the post-conciliar Church. Dialogue in Ecclesiam suam.

The word dialogue represents the biggest change in the mentality of the Church after the council, only comparable in its importance with the change wrought by the word liberty in the last century, The word was completely unknown and unused in the Church's teaching before the council. It does not occur once in any previous council, or in papal encyclicals, or in sermons or in pastoral practice. In the Vatican II documents it occurs 28 times, twelve of them in the decree on ecumenism Unitatis Redintegratio. Nonetheless, through its lightning spread and enormous broadening in meaning, this word, which is very new in the Catholic Church, became the master-word determining post-conciliar thinking, and a catch-all category in a newfangled mentality.[1] People not only talk about ecumenical dialogue, dialogue between the Church and the world, ecclesial dialogue, but by an enormous catachresis, a dialogical structure is atributed to theology, pedagogy, catechesis, the Trinity, the history of salvation, schools, families, the priesthood, the sacraments, redemption, and to everything else that had existed in the Church for centuries without the concept of being in anybody's mind or the word occuring in the language.

The movement from a thetic manner of talking, which was appropriate to religion, to a hypothetic and problematic style, is apparent even in the titles of books, which used to teach, but now enquire. Books that were called Institutiones or "manuals" or "treatises" on philosophy, theology or any other science have been replaced by "Problems in philosophy," "Problems in theology," and manuals are abhored and despised precisely because of their positive and apodictic nature. It has happened in all areas: no more nurses' manual, but problems in nursing, not drivers' manual but drivers' problems and so on, with everything moving from the certain to the uncertain, the positive to the problematic. It is a decline from an intentional apropriation of a real objects by means of knowledge (signified by the syllable no in nosco, I know) to a simple throwing of the object before the mind (proballo in Greek, from which we get problem).

In August 1964, devoting a third of his first encyclical Ecclesiam Suam to dialogue, Paul VI equated the Church's duty to evangelize the world with a duty to dialogue with the world. But one cannot help noticing that the equation is supported neither by Scripture nor the dictionary. The word dialogue never occurs in Scripture and its Latin equivalent colloquium is only used in the sense of a meeting between chief persons and of a conversation, never in the modern sense of a group meeting. Colloquium on three occasions in the New Testament means a dispute. Evangelization is a proclamation not a dispute or a conversation. The Evangelization the Apostles are commanded to undertake in the Gospel is immediately identified with teaching. The very word angelos carries the idea of something that is given to be announce, not something thrown into dispute. It is true that Peter and Paul dispute in the synagoges, but it is not a question of dialoguing in the modern sense of dialogue in search of something, setting from a position of ostensible ignorance, but rather a dialogue in refutation of errors. The possibility of dialogue disappears, in their case, the moment the disputants are no longer open to persuasion, whether through his obstinacy or his incapacity. This can be seen, for example, in St. Paul's refusal of dialogue in one occasion.[2] Just as Christ spoke with authority: Erat docens eos sicut potestatem habens,[3] so the apostles preached the gospel in an authoritative manner, not looking to validate it by dialogue. In the same place Christ's positive way of teaching is contrasted with the dialogues of the scribes and pharisees. The heart of the matter is that the Church's message is not a human product, always open to argument, but a revealed message designed to be accepted rather than argued about.

After having equated evangelization with dialogue, Ecclesiam Suam denies that evangelization, or preaching the truth, means condemning errors, and it identifies condemnation with coercion. The theme of the council's opening speech thus returns.[4]

"Our mission," the encyclical says, "is to announce the truths that are so undeniable and necessary to salvation; it will not come armed with external coercion, but with legitimate means of human education." This is a legitimate and traditional manner of approach, as was proved by the fact that immediately after the encyclical's publication, Wisser't Hooft, the Secretary of the World Council of Churches, hastened to state that the Pope's ideal of a dialogue as a communication of truth without a reciprocal reply, was not in accordance with ecumenical ideas.[5]

    [1] In the Osservatore Romano of 15 March 1971, Cardinal Roy said dialogue was a new experience for the Church and for the world. On 15-16 November 1966, on the other hand, the Osservatore said that the Church had always practiced dialogue (mixing it up with controversy and refutation of other arguments) and that if there had been times when it did not practice it, "they were more or less depressed periods."

    [2] Acts, 19:8-9.

    [3] Matthew 7:29, "He taught them as one having authority."

    [4] See paragraph 38.

    [5] O.R., 13 September 1964.


152. Philosophy of dialogue.
The new fangled dialogue is based on "the perpetual problemacity of the Christian subject," as the Osservatore Romano puts it,[6] that is, on the impossibility of ever getting into anything that is not itself problematic. In short it denies the old principle, recognize in logic, metaphysics and morality, that anagke stenai.[7]

Dialogue first runs into trouble when it is made to coincide with the Church's universal task of evangelization and heralded as a means of spreading the truth. It is impossible for everyone to dialogue. The possibility of holding a dialogue depends on the knowledge of one has of a subject, and not, as is alleged, on the fact of one's liberty of the dignity of one's soul. The right to argue depends on knowledge, not on man's general ordering towards the truth. Socrates said that on matter of gymnastics, one should consult an expert in gymnastics, on horses an expert on things equine, on wounds and diseases an expert in medicine and on the running of society an expert in politics. Expertise is a result of effort and study, of reflecting on things methodically and steadily rather than hastily and extempore. Contemporary dialogue presupposes, however, that any man is capable of dialoguing with anyone else on any subject, simply in virtue of being a rational creature. The demand is therefore made that the life of a temporal community and the Church should be arranged so that everyone can participate; not as the Catholic system envisages, by each person contributing his knowledge and playing his own proper part, but by everybody giving his opinion and deciding on everything. The paradox is that this right to argue is being extended to everyone at the very moment when the knowledge that gives an authentic title to join the arguments is getting scarcer and feebler even among the Church's teachers.

The next blunder relates to the onus of proof. It is assumed that dialogue can and should satisfy all the objections of an opponent. Now for one man to offer himself to another with the aim of giving him complete intellectual satisfaction on any point of religion is a sign of a moral failing. It is rash for somebody who has asserted a truth to proceed to expose himself to a general, extempore and unlimited discussion. Every subject has many facets; he is familiar with only some, or even one of them. Yet he exposes himself as if he were ready for every objection, impossible to catch off guard, and as if he had anticipated every possible thought that could arise on the matter.

Dialogue labors under yet another difficulty from the side of the inquirer, because it is rests on a gratuitous presupposition that St. Augustine perceptively detected in his day. An intellect can be capable of formulating an objection without being capable of understanding the argument that meets the objection. This fact, that an individual's intellectual strenght may be greater in raising objections than in understanding replies, is a common cause of error. Ecce unde plerumque convalescit error, cum homines idonei sunt his rebus interrogandis quibus intellegandis non sunt idonei.[8]

This diproportion between an intellect's asking a question and understanding a reply is a result of the general difference between potency and act. Refusal to recognize this difference leads to an illogical conclusion in politics: everyone has by nature a capacity to know the truth, therefore everyone actually knows the truth.

In the first book of his Theodicy, Antonio Rosmini also teaches that an individual should not trust his own intellectual powers to solve the questions that arise regarding the workings of divine Providence: no individual can be certain that his own intellectual strength is up to meeting all the objections that might face it. This uncertainty as to a person's intellectual capacities is what Descartes ignored in his method, when he imagined that the power of reason was equally strong and equally exercisable in each individual.

    [6] O.R., 15 January 1971.

    [7] "It is necessary to stop somewhere."

    [8]De peccatorum meritiset remissione, lib. III, cap 8. "Here is a thing that often fosters error; when men are capable of enquiring into things they are not capable of understanding."


153. Appropriateness of dialogue.

In Scripture, evangelization proceed by teaching not by dialogue. Christ's last command to His disciples was matheteuein and didaskein, which literally means make disciples of all men, rather as if the Apostles' task consisted in leading the nations to the condition of listeners and disciples, with matheteuein as a preliminary grade of didaskein, to teach.[9]

Besides lacking a biblical foundation, dialogues is also void of a gnoseological one, because the nature of dialogue is incompatible with a line of argument based on faith. It assumes that the credibility of religion depends on a prior resolution of every particular objection made to it. Now that cannot be had, and cannot be made a precondition for an assent of faith. The correct order is the other way around. Having established even by one convincing consideration that religion is true, the latter is to be held on to even if particular difficulties remain unresolved. As Rosmini teaches,[10] the proposition "the Catholic religion is true" means that there are a great many possible objections that could be raised against it. But it is no necessary to have previously resolved the 15,000 objections in the Summa Theologica before one can reasonably assent to Catholicism. Its truth is, in short, not to be garnered synthetically, as a compound of particular truths, and does not imply that entire intellectual satisfaction necessarily accompanies its acceptance; in fact it is assent to that overall truth that leads one on to the particular assents that follows.

Lastly it should be noted that the present idea of dialogue obscures the way of useful ignorance that is appropriate for minds that are incapable of adopting the way of examination, and that adhere firmly to their fundamental assent and do not devote much attention to opposing views, to find out where their error lies. Being afraid of ideas opposed to what they know is certainly true, they keep themselves in ignorance to preserve the truths they already possess, and shut out false ideas and also any true ones that happen to be mixed in with them, without separating the one from other.

This way of useful ignorance is legitimate in Catholicism, is based on the theoretical principle explained earlier, and is moreover the condition in which the great majority of all religious believers find themselves.[11] It is therefore untrue to say as the Osservatore Romano does that "anyone who refuses dialogue is a fanatic, an intolerant person who always ends up being unfaithful to himself and then to the society of which he is part. Anyone who does dialogue gives up isolation and condemnations."[12] To dialogue unconditionally in all circumstances is a sign of rashness, and of fanaticism that replaces the objective force of truth by one's own subjective capacities.

    [9] In his commentary on Matthew, Paris 1927, p.144, Lagrange translates the first word by enseigner and the second by apprendre.

    [10] Epistolario, Vol. VIII, Casale 1891, p.464, letter of 8 June 1843 to Countess Theodora Bielinski.

    [11] The theory of useful ignorance is developped by Manzoni in his Morale Cattolica. ed. cit., Vol II, pp.422-3 and Vol. III. p.131.

    [12] O.R., 15-16 November 1965.


154. The end of dialogue. Paul VI. The Secretariat for Non-Believers.

The difference between the old and new sorts of dialogue can be seen very clearly in the ends assigned to them. The new sort, some say, is not directed towards the refuting of error or the converting of one's interlocutor.[13] The new fashioned mentality abhors anything polemical, holding it to be incompatible with charity even thought it be in reality an act of charity. The idea of polemics is inseparable from the opposition between truth and falsehood. A polemic is aimed precisely at overthrowing any pretended equality between the two. Thus polemic is connatural to thought, since it removes errors in one's own thinking even when it fails to persuade an opponent.

From the Catholic's point of view, the end of dialogue cannot be heuristic, since he is in possession of religious truth, not in search for it. Nor can it be eristic, that is, aimed at winning the argument for its own sake, since its motive and goal is charity. True dialogue is aimed at demonstrating a truth, at producing a conviction in another person, and ultimately at conversion. This was clearly taught by Pauls VI in his speech of 27 June 1968: "It is not enough to draw close to others, to talk to them, to assure them of our trust and to seek their good. One must also take steps to convert them. One must preach to get them to come back. One must try to incorporate them into the divine plan, that is one and unique." This is a very important papal utterance, because the Pope was expressly talking about ecumenical dialogue; its importance was confirmed by the fact that the Osservatore Romano even printed it in a different type, a unique event.

That notwithstanding, in 1975 the head of the Secretariat for Non-Believers made the following diametrically opposite assertion: "The Secretariat was certainly not created with the intention of proselytizing among non-believers, even if that word is understood in a positive sense; nor with an apologetic intent but rather with the aim of promoting dialogue between believers and unbelievers."[14] When I objected to the author that his text contradicted Pope Paul's assertion, he replied[15] that the Secretariat does nothing without the agreement of higher authority and that the particular article had been seen by the Secretariat of State prior to publication. The letter simply makes the difference between the Pope and the Secretariat for Non-Believers all the more obvious. As to my specific objection, the letter answered that although the Church had the task of converting the world "that does not imply that every step and every organization in the Church is specifically aimed at converting one's interlocutor."

This answer lacks charity. The Church has a single all-embracing goal which is human salvation, and everything it does is one particular expression of that goal: when it teaches, it teaches not baptizes; when it baptizes, it baptizes not teaches; when it consecrates the Eucharist it consecrates not absolves, and so on. But all these specific ends are precisely specifications and actuations of the all-embracing goal, and all of them are aimed at turning men towards God, that is at conversion. It is this ultimate end that gives direction to all the Church's subordinate goals, and without it none of the lesser goals would be pursued.[16] The statement of Paul VI we have quoted asserts unequivocally that dialogue is aimed at conversion.

    [13] See the Istruzione per il dialogo published on 28 August 1968 by the Secretariat for Non-Believers.

    [14] O.R., 21 August 1975.

    [15] In an official letter of 9 september 1975.

    [16] Summa Theologica, I,II,q.1,a.4.


155. Whether dialogue is always an enrichment.

De facto conversion and apologetics have been excluded from post-conciliar dialogue which is said to be "always a positive exchange"; but that assertions is difficult to accept.

Firstly, as well as dialogue that converts there is a dilaogue that perverts, by which one party is detached from the truth and led into error. Or will it be pretended that truth is always efficacious and that error never is?

Secondly, there is the situation where instead of helping the participants, dialogue presents them with an impossible task. St. Thomas envisages the case in which it is impossible to prove the truth to the person one is addressing because there is no jointly held principle on which to base the argument. All that can then be done is to prove that the opponent's arguments are not conclusive and that his objections can be met. In such circumstances, it is not true that dialogue has a positive outcome for both parties and constitutes a mutual enrichment. The dialogue is unproductive. If its usefulness is then alleged to lie in getting to know the psychology and ideology of one's partner, the answer is that such things are the province of psychology, and are not the goal of a religious dialogue; they belong to history, biography or sociology. Such knowledge can indeed be useful in adjusting the dialogue in a manner more appropriate to the participants, but that is not the same thing as being a mutual enrichment.




156. Catholic dialogue.

The aim of Catholic dialogue is persuasion and, at a higher level, conversion of the other party.

Bishop Marafini says "the method of dialogue is understood as a movement converging towards the fullness of truth and a search for deep unity," but it is not quite clear what he means.[17]

There is a tendency to confuse dialogue on natural matters with dialogue concerning supernatural faith. The former is carried on by the light of reason that all men have in common. Everyone is equal under that light, and above their dialogue, as we have said,[18] they can sense a more important Logos that makes them realize they are brothers, profoundly united by their common nature. But in dialogue about the faith, the two parties cannot converge towards the truth or put themselves on a par. The non-believer rejects or doubts in a way the believer cannot.

It might be objected that the believer adopts a process of methodic doubt, analogous to Descartes': the believer adopts an unbelieving position only for the purpose of dialogue. But the difficulty returns: if doubt or rejection of faith is real, it implies a loss of faith and a sin on the part of the believer. If it is hypothetical or feigned, the dialogue is flawed by a pretense and rest on an immoral basis. There is also the question of whether someone who pretends not to believe what in fact he does, is not sinning against faith, and whether a dialogue based on pretense is not bound to be unproductive as well as wrong. It has been claimed[19] that dialogue is fruitful for the believer's faith, quite apart from being an act of charity. But there is a clear contradiction involved. The article presents a dilemma that "if the Lord Jesus one knows is not the supreme and totalizing for man...one will have something other and greater to learn than what one has received by grace." And if on the other hand Christ is that supreme and totalizing truth "one cannot see how an idea or an experience can be added to him." But then the author casts his dilemma aside and says the believer does in fact gain something to add to his faith by the dialogue "on condition that these new acquisitions are not seen as additions to Christ. They are simply facets, dimensions, aspects of the mystery of Christ which the believer already possess but discover thanks to the stimulus of those who, through not Christians consciously, are Christians in concrete fact." This is to say that an addition to knowledge is not an addition to knowledge; that an atheist is an implicit Christian;[20] and that the atheist possesses facets of the Christian mystery which the explicit Christian does not know but which the atheist will suggest to him.

We may conclude by saying that the new sort of dialogue is not Catholic. Firstly, because it has a purely heuristic function, as if the Church in dialogue did not possess the truth and were looking for it, or as if it could prescind from possessing the truth as long as the dialogue lasted. Secondly, because it does not recognize the superior authority of revealed truth, as if there were no longer any distinction in importance between nature and revelation. Thirdly, because it imagines the parties to dialogue are on an equal footing, albeit a merely methodological equality, as if it were not a sin against faith to waive the advantage that comes from divine truth, even as a dialectical ploy. Fourthly, because it postulates that every human philosophical position is unendingly debatable, as if there were not fundamental points of contradiction sufficient to stop a dialogue and leave room only for refutation. Fifthly, because it supposes that dialogue is always fruitful and that "nobody has to sacrifice anything,"[21] as if dialogue could never be corrupting and lead to the uprooting of truth and implanting error, and as if nobody had to reject any errors they had previously professed.

Dialogue converging towards a higher and more universal truth does not suit the Catholic Church, because an heuristic process putting the Church on the road to truth does not suit it; what is appropriate for the Church is the act of charity, whereby a truth possessed by grace is communicated to others and they are thereby drawn to that truth, not to the Church as an end in itself. The superiority here is not that of the believer over the non-believer, but of truth over all parties in dialogue. It should not be thought that the act of one man persuading another of the truth is tantamount to an act of oppression or an attack on the other's freedom. Logical contradiction and an "either or" are part of the structure of reality, not a kind of violence.

The sociological effect of Pyrrhonism, and the discussionism that follows from it, can be seen the flood of conventions, meetings, comissions and congresses that began with Vatican II. It has also caused the current tendency to regard everything as problematic and to refer all such problems to comittees, so that the responsibility that used to be personal and individual has been dispersed within collegial bodies. Discussionism has developped a whole technique of its own; in Rome in 1972 there was a convention of moderators of dialogues, which was designed to train the moderators, as if one could direct a dialogue in general, without any specific knowledge of what the dialogue were about.

    [17] O.R., 18 December 1971. Cardinal König said when presenting the instruction on dialogue to the press that: "Dialogue puts the partners on an equal footing. The Catholic is not considered as possessing all the truth, but as someone who has faith as is looking for that truth with others, both believers and non-believers." I.C.I., No.322, 15 October 1968, p.20.

    [18] In paragraph 125.

    [19] In an article on "Faith and dialogue" in O.R., 26-27 December 1981.

    [20] See paragraph 253.

    [21] O.R., 19 November 1971.

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hwijaya



Joined: 05 Feb 2008
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PostPosted: Sat, 12-07-2008 2:37 pm    Post subject: Reply with quote

Salam damai Kristus,

Good job DV! Thanks for your effort to put this in this forum.

Saya ada yg enggak ngerti nih, tolong dijelaskan:

Quote:
The next blunder relates to the onus of proof. It is assumed that dialogue can and should satisfy all the objections of an opponent. Now for one man to offer himself to another with the aim of giving him complete intellectual satisfaction on any point of religion is a sign of a moral failing.


dan:
Quote:
It might be objected that the believer adopts a process of methodic doubt, analogous to Descartes': the believer adopts an unbelieving position only for the purpose of dialogue. But the difficulty returns: if doubt or rejection of faith is real, it implies a loss of faith and a sin on the part of the believer.


Kenapa believers adopts an unbelieving position ......?
Wah seram juga believers bisa lost of faith? Apa yg harus kita lakukan kalau berdialog dgn unbelievers yg keras kepala?

Segini dulu. Saya belum selesai bacanya. Mesti pelan-pelan nih - isinya berat buat saya yg inggrisnya pas-pasan.

Thank you in advance for your response.

JHW
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hwijaya



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PostPosted: Sun, 13-07-2008 9:23 am    Post subject: Reply with quote

Hi DV,

I just realized that this is English only forum. You may delete my post above.

Good job DV! Thanks for your effort to put the "Iota Unum" in this forum.

Quote:
The next blunder relates to the onus of proof. It is assumed that dialogue can and should satisfy all the objections of an opponent. Now for one man to offer himself to another with the aim of giving him complete intellectual satisfaction on any point of religion is a sign of a moral failing.


What does it mean with the sentence that I bold above, especially "a sign of a moral failing?"


Quote:
It might be objected that the believer adopts a process of methodic doubt, analogous to Descartes': the believer adopts an unbelieving position only for the purpose of dialogue. But the difficulty returns: if doubt or rejection of faith is real, it implies a loss of faith and a sin on the part of the believer.


Why believers adopt an unbelieving position only for the purpose of dialogue?

It is a little bit scary that we (the believer) may lose faith and sin when we have a dialogue with the unbeliever if we lose in the dialogue? Am I correct here? I guess we need to be very careful and read a lot the Holy Bible, Holy Tradition and Magisterium.

Thanks in advance for you explanation.

Blessings in Christ,
JHW
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Athanasios
Penghuni Ekaristi


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PostPosted: Sun, 13-07-2008 4:20 pm    Post subject: Reply with quote

hwijaya wrote:
Why believers adopt an unbelieving position only for the purpose of dialogue?

It is a little bit scary that we (the believer) may lose faith and sin when we have a dialogue with the unbeliever if we lose in the dialogue? Am I correct here? I guess we need to be very careful and read a lot the Holy Bible, Holy Tradition and Magisterium.


Actually we don't have such term as "win" or "lose" on a dialogue. The real problem is on a dialogue we have to find a common ground and sometimes it seems that the heretical or heterodox positions are more fit to be a common ground for dialogue rather than the Catholic position.

For example when we have dialogue about the Church with various Protestant communities, we see that meanwhile the Catholic positions hold that there is only one true Church the Protestants hold that there is only one true invinsible Church and many visible Churches represent the invinsible one.

Undoubtely the Protestant's view are sounds more friendly rather than the Catholic's one. In case of dialogue holding the Catholic position may change the dialogue into apologetic debates, and sometimes the Catholics adopt the Protestan position for the sake of the dialogue and so the danger occur.

Sorry for my bad english, but hopefully you've got my point. good Job
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DeusVult
Evangelos


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PostPosted: Tue, 29-07-2008 6:34 pm    Post subject: Reply with quote

hwijaya wrote:
Saya ada yg enggak ngerti nih, tolong dijelaskan:

Quote:

The next blunder relates to the onus of proof. It is assumed that dialogue can and should satisfy all the objections of an opponent. Now for one man to offer himself to another with the aim of giving him complete intellectual satisfaction on any point of religion is a sign of a moral failing.

It's fairly straighforward.

When you engage in an inter-religious dialogue, let's say, with a Protestant, then the range of issues that divide both sides are: Papal infallibility, sacraments, justification, Tradition, Mary, the sacrifice of the Mass, deuterocanon etc.

Amerio say that "it is assumed that dialogue can and should satisfy all the objections of an opponent." That means that a Catholic should prepare to answer all objections that Protestant can come up with within such a plethora range of issues. Not only that, but the Catholic must answer in such way that the opponent (ie. Protestant) is intelectually satisfied.

Now, for a Catholic to open himself to that many objections would be a sign of a moral failing. What moral failing? Rashness and arrogance.


What makes me wonder tho is where did Amerio get the idea that there's such an assumption (ie. an assumption that dialogue can and should satisfy all the objections of an opponent). He's not being clear on this.

hwijaya wrote:
Quote:

It might be objected that the believer adopts a process of methodic doubt, analogous to Descartes': the believer adopts an unbelieving position only for the purpose of dialogue. But the difficulty returns: if doubt or rejection of faith is real, it implies a loss of faith and a sin on the part of the believer.


Kenapa believers adopts an unbelieving position ......?

You need a closer look at the paragraph above it. Here's a snippet of the relevant parts:

    There is a tendency to confuse dialogue on natural matters with dialogue concerning supernatural faith. ... [I]n dialogue about the faith, the two parties cannot converge towards the truth or put themselves on a par. The non-believer rejects or doubts in a way the believer cannot.

There's a disturbing typo. I wrote "of" instead of "or" after the word "truth" before the word "put." I already corrected it.

As Amerio puts it, "it is no necessary to have previously resolved the 15,000 objections in the Summa Theologica before one can reasonably assent to Catholicism."

Suppose you're dialoguing with a moslem. Let's say you can answer all his questions and objections, would that guarantee his conversion? No. The best you could do is satisfying his intelect which doesn't automaticaly move his will to assent to the true faith.

Faith is a virtue infused by God and it's supernatural. One can not have faith if God doesn't give it. Satisfying the intelect by giving reasonable answers for all objections could only moves obstacles to come to the true faith. It doesn't give faith itself. God must give the person the grace of faith and the person should move his will to accept it (even the movement of the will to accept faith is impossible without the help of God's supernatural grace).

So, the difference between a believer and an unbeliever is not wheter a believer is intelectually satisfied thereby he has faith and an unbeliever is intelectually unsatisfied thereby he has no faith. One can have faith without being intelectually satisfied while another can have no faith while being intelectually satisfied. This is why Amerio wrote, "The non-believer rejects or doubts in a way the believer cannot."

Next, Amerio is aware of an objection to that proposition (ie. "the non-believer rejects or doubts in a way the believer cannot"). The objection says that in order for the believer to rejects or doubts just as an unbeliever the believer should "adopts an unbelieving position only for the purpose of dialogue."

So a Catholic should learn to doubt his faith just as a moslem doubt the faith of the Church. Why? So that both parties can be on a par (tho in truth they can not, because the supernatural and gratious character of faith already explained above).

If the Catholic does learn to doubt his faith and he actually did, then he has lost it. On the other hand, if the Catholic feigned his doubt (ie. he doesn't really doubt his faith) then he's not being honest. When that happens the sincerity that should be the basis of a good dialogue is lost.

Quote:
Wah seram juga believers bisa lost of faith?

No. Amerio is not saying that we would loose our faith if we dialogue with non-Catholic.

He simply says that we must realize that in dialogue about faith, the two parties cannot put themselves on a par. The believer has faith, the unbeliever doesn't.

Putting them on a par means that either the believer must give up his faith or the unbeliever acquired faith.

Quote:
Apa yg harus kita lakukan kalau berdialog dgn unbelievers yg keras kepala?

Pray.

In the end, faith is a gift from God.
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BerthaStymn



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PostPosted: Wed, 02-11-2016 2:19 pm    Post subject: Dialogue IOTA UNUM Romano AMERIO Reply with quote

Dialogue animations? Hard? :lol
Theyre easy Well for me anyway, but then again Im strange.
Il try and make it animated to give you an idea of what it should look like.
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